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LIQUOR
Federal and state courts alike have always permitted great latitude
in the regulation of liquor and the liquor industry. Thus, delegation of
power cases received less scrutiny when liquor regulation is involved,
licensing statutes are broadly interpreted, and the due process clauses
afford little comfort to the liquor interests.' Consequently, it could have
been expected after Repeal that the apparent judicial preference for re-
strictive liquor legislation would continue and that the philosophy of the
Webb-Kenyon Act would be judicially infused into that portion of the
21st amendment which reads, "the transportation or importation into
any state ... for delivery or use therein of any intoxicating liquors, in
the violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 2 Unexpectedly,
however, the court found no arid purpose in the amendment and held
that it would protect all liquor regulation within the terms of the amend-
ment free from other constitutional requirements.3 Thus from the start
trade barriers in the liquor field were given judicial sanction.
The court first determined in Young's Market case4 that the states'
power was plenary and no limitation was imposed on it by the commerce
clause. Within two terms the court further exempted state liquor rega-
lation from the limitation of the equal protection clause5 and the due
process clause.6 In spite of the sharp criticism which these cases in-
. . . it is difficult to perceive any ground for the judiciary to
declare that the prohibition by Kansas . . . is not fairly adopted
to the end of protecting the community against the evils which
confessedly result from the excessive use of ardent spirits
If therefore, a state deems the absolute prohibition of the manu-
facture and sale, within her limits, of intoxicating liquors . . .
necessary to the peace and security of society, the courts cannot,
without usurping legislative functions, override the will of the
people as thus expressed by their chosen representatives." Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661 (1887).
2 U.S. CONST. Amend XXI, §2. A similar problem is presented in the
marketing of convict-made goods. Many states have enacted
statutes prohibiting the sale of convict-made goods within their
borders, or requiring that such goods be marked as such before
being put on the market. Although these statutes are a restric-
tion on interstate commerce, the Ashurst-Sumners Act, 49 Stat.
494 (1935), 49 U.S.C.A. §§61-64 (Supp. 1939), has made it illegal
to import products made by convict labor into a state in viola-
tion of state law. As a result convict-made goods statutes are
free commerce clause restrictions. Under the Ashurst-Sumners
Act, modeled after the Webb-Kenyon Act, the situation with re-
spect to regulation of convict-made goods is the same as it was
with respect to liquor before the 21st Amendment. Kentucky
Whip and Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 299 U.S. 334
(1937).
3 The amendment grants to "the state the power to forbid all importa-
tions which do not comply with the conditions it prescribes."
State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U. S. 59, 62
(1936).
4299 U. S. 59 (1936).
5 Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938).6 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 305 U. S.
391 (1939).
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yoked,7 no limiting decisions of the Supreme Court have as yet appeared
and the road to retaliation and discrimination still is clear and inviting.
The 21st amendment, in spite of the courts' broad and inclusive in-
terpretation, does not apply, however, if: (1) transportation is not "in
violation of the laws," (2) exportation is involved, and (3) transportation
is through a state.
In the light of the courts' expanded meaning of "in violation of the
laws'"8 it might seem academic to raise the question of the regulation
of imports in violation of state law. Nevertheless the question may have
some practical importance if the court should interpret the amendment
as a grant of power and hold that the states' failure to exercise the
power, though negative, excluded federal regulation in the same fashion
as the failure of Congress to act in matters of interstate commerce may
under certain circumstances exclude state regulation.9
As a matter of statutory interpretation it would appear that the
regulation of the export of liquor was not protected by the 21st amend-
ment. No case directly on the point has yet arisen but in Ziffrin, Inc.
v. Reeves'0 the Supreme Court held that a non-discriminatory regulation
of transporters of liquor was valid when applied to transporters for ex-
port even though there was a burden on interstate commerce."
When interstate commerce in liquor commences outside the state,
passes through, and terminates outside the state, the amendment would
seem not to apply. 2 In this situation the state apparently has no power
to prohibit or regulate the shipment and the power of the federal govern-
ment is unaffected by the amendment. But, except for these specific
situations which have no important effect upon the industry as a whole,
the result of the Court's interpretation is to burden commerce in liquor
with whatever barrier legislation the states can devise.' 3
Naturally, much liquor control legislation is defensible police and
7 "There is no indication in the debates that Congress intended to do
anything more than protect the dry states. Certainly it did not
intend to place commerce in respect to liquor back where it was
before the Constitution, enabling the states: to set up tariff walls,
to discriminate against the products of one state in favor of those
of another, or to render nugatory the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the due process clause." de
Gonahl, The Scope of Federal Power over Alcoholic Beverages
since the Twenty-First Amendment, (1940) 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
819, 822; COMENT (1937) 25 Calif. L. Rev. 718; LEGIS. NOTE
(1938) 38 Calif. L. Rev. 644; cf. NOTE (1939) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 685.
8 "Pure logic aside-whether the Amendment says so or not, common
sense compels the conclusion that the state laws involved must
be normal, enforcable laws, . . . within the bounds of some
reason; . . ." LEGIS. NOTE (1938) 38 Cal. L. Rev. 644, 659 n. 111.
0 de Gonahl, The Scope of Federal Power over Alcoholic Beverages
since the Twenty-First Amendment (1940) 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
819, 875.
10 308 U. S. 132 (1939).
11 South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 189.
(1937).
12 Williams v. Commonwealth, 169 Va. 857, 192 S. E. 795 (1937).
13 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY W.P.A. (1939) 63-71.
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revenue regulation.14 And even some of the economic advantages given
to local liquor retailers may stem from a laudable desire to protect
distributors from the temptations which too active competition engend-
ers-sales to minors and intoxicated persons, credit sales, etc. But dis-
criminatory liquor regulation has gone all the way, so that much of it
has no other justification than the protection of "home industry".
This protection has been achieved in three ways: preferences for
state grown products,15 discriminatory license and excise taxation,1 6
and retaliatory legislation.1 7 The extent of the protection has depended
in part on the nature of the liquor industry itself-thus, the concentra-
tion of the distilled spirits industries in a few states has resulted in less
barrier legislation directed against production than in the case of beer
and wine where manufacture to a considerable extent is local to every
state.' 8 At the distributive level, however, the local wholesaler and dis-
tributor enjoy protection against the importer of all classes of liquor
stocks.' 9 An analysis of all this regulation is impossible, however, with-
in the compass of this note.
Illustratively, the Indiana-Michigan beer war tells of the struggle
for economic preference. Limiting the importation of beer under a port
of entry system, Indiana imposed heavy license taxes and stringent bond
requirements on all importers. 20 This, the Michigan control commission
determined was a discrimination against Michigan beer and pursuant to
statutory authority they forbade Michigan licensees to deal in Indiana
beer.21 When this action was sustained in the Supreme Court,22 Indiana
1 4 LEGIS. NOTE (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 644, 647.
'U Preferences may grant license exemptions to liquor manufacturers
in the state using raw materials produced in the state [Ala. Laws
1937, §22(1); GA. CODE (1938 Supp.) §58:1046; Me. Laws 1934
Sp. Sess., Ch. 298; N.C. CODE, §3411(31)] or require the use by
state manufacturers of a percentage of state produce [oHIo CODE
(Page's Supp. 1937) §§ 6064-3(a), 6064-15] or require a percent-
age of produce commonly grown in the state [IOWA CODE 1935,§ 1921-f97; Minn. Laws 1937, c. 59].
16 See, MARKETING LAWS SURVEY WPA (1939) 65-71.
'7 Commission may act to prevent discrimination [IND. STAT. ANN.
(Burns Supp. 1939) §§ 12-1001 to 12-1007; N. J. REV. STAT.
§ 33-1-39.1; Ore. Laws 1939, c. 247; PA. CODE (Purdon's 1938)
§ 47-100-K-1] or importation from discriminating state prohibited
[Ala. Laws 1937, p. 85; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1011] or may tax
imports an amount equal to the discriminatory tax [Conn. Laws,
1937, c. 151, § 626d(s); FLA. CODE § 4151 (235); OHIO CODE
(Page's Supp. 1937) § 6064-47(A); R. I. Laws 1938, c. 167.]
Is The distilled spirits industry is limited to nine states, but 33 states
produce wine, and breweries exist in 40. For further details
concerning the distribution of the industries, see, Green, Inte'-
state Barriers in the Alcoholic Beverage Field, (1940) 7 Law &
Cont. Prob. 717, 724-726.
lq MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, WPA (1939) 65-71; LEGIS. NOTE (1938)
38 Col. L. Rev. 644.
20 Ind. Laws 1935, c. 226, § 9.
21 Mich. Laws 1937, No. 281, § 4.
22 Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., 305 U. S. 391
(1939).
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retaliated by ordering her importers to exclude Michigan beer. By
gentlemen's agreement, both embargoes were suspended until the Indi-
ana legislative session of 1939. Indiana then repealed her port of entry
law and adopted a defensive discrimination act which permits the ex-
clusion of beer produced in states discriminating against Indiana beer
and which authorizes the commission to enter into reciprocity agree-
ments promotive of free trade.23 Active controversy is at an end, but
the states have kept their powder dry, and so long as the Court and
Congress do not take active leadership the desire for local advantage
will continue to burden the free flow of commerce. 24
Important as free commerce is to national unity, one economic ad-
vantage should be credited to the barrier legislation. It has encouraged
sale near the source of manufacture and discourages the economically
unsound practice of shipping New York beer to St. Louis and St. Louis
beer to New York. So long as active and efficient competition on a
basis of price and quality obtains locally, the consumer should achieve
advantages resulting from the elimination of heavy transportation and
distribution costs sustained by companies following the will-o'-the-wisp
of a national market. To date, unfortunately, these advantages are not
evident.
V.R.B.
GENERAL PREFERENCE LAWS
Preference to local laborers, business firms, and products in the
expenditure of government funds is common in nearly every state in the
Union. Motivated by the desire to benefit resident laborers and busi-
ness firms, preference legislation normally increases during periods of
economic stress. Thus, during the last depression such statutes became
extensive.1
Preference laws protecting the local labor market in the field of
public employment from out-of-state competition have been enacted by
approximately two-thirds of the states. The strictness of this regulation
ranges from mere directory preferences of residents and the prohibition
of alien employees to the imposition of residence or citizenship qualifi-
cations as conditions to employment on public works.2
23Ind. Stat. Ann (Burns Supp. 1939) §§12-1001 to 12-1007.
24 Giving the states enough rope is perhaps the most significant con-
tribution of the Supreme Court's surprising interpretation of the
Twenty-First Amendment for we can test by experience the ne-
cessity of the commerce clause as an instrument of national unity.
See McAllister, Court, Congress and Trade Barriers, supra p. 144.
1ARKETING LAWS SURVEY, W.P.A. (1939) 83-88.
2 Statutes merely requiring that residents be preferred: Conn. Gen. Stat.
Supp. (1931, 1933, 1935) c. 279, §1603c; Idaho Laws 1935, c. 140;
Iowa Code (1939) §1171.03. Preference requested only by resolution
of the legislature: Texas Laws 2d Called Sess. 1931, S.C.R. No. 10,
p. 73. Preference of citizens: Rev. Code Del (1935) c. 90 §3644; Rev.
Stats. N.J. (1937) §34:9-2. Prohibition of employment of aliens: Ga.
Laws Ex. Sess. 1937-38, Title IV, No. 376, p. 189. Requirement that
as a condition to employment, the laborer must have been a resident
for a certain minimum length of time: Stats. Ark. (Pope's Digest,
